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The Austrian Theory of Economic Transition
Yuri Maltsev (text of Vilnius speech)
"And no one can find a safe way out for himself if society is sweeping towards destruction. Therefore everyone, in his own interests, must thrust himself vigorously into the intellectual battle. None can stand aside with unconcern;
the interests of everyone hang on the result. Whether he chooses or not, every man is drawn into the great historical struggle, the decisive battle into which our epoch has plunged us." Ludwig von Mises
It is only twelve years passed since the collapse of the last major empire – the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. The developments of the last decade changed the course of the world history to an extent not yet fully
understood by contemporaries. Austrian economic theory provides us with the key to such understanding. In "The Essential von Mises"
Murray Rothbard wrote:
"In an environment of accelerating statism and socialism, Ludwig von Mises...turned his powerful attention to analyzing the
economics of government intervention and planning. His journal article of 1920, "Economic calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth", was a blockbuster: demonstrating for the first time that socialism was an unviable system for an industrial economy;
for Mises showed that a socialist economy totally deprived of a free market price system, could not rationally calculate costs or
allocate factors of production efficiently to their most needed tasks"1.
The lessons we can learn from the tragic experiences of nations enslaved in the Soviet empire and
Austrian critique of socialism should give us a better perspective on our own situation, on dangers of seemingly simple and quick
solutions to our own problems.
Two patterns for the realization of socialism
The socialist tragedy known as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was not an isolated event in
Russian history. The beginning of the 20th century, however, marked a qualitative change in this respect: the interrelationship
and mutual influence of economic process and political power were significantly deepened. These change meant more government
intervention, more regulations, more social and ethnic engineering. The huge bureaucratic regulatory state created by governments
of Nicholas II in Russia was the direct predecessor of socialism.
Ludwig von Mises analyzed "two patterns for the realization of socialism". He wrote:
"The first pattern (we may call it the Lenin or the Russian pattern) is purely bureaucratic. All plants, shops and
farms are formally nationalized (verstaatlicht); they are departments of the government operated by civil servants. Every unit of
the apparatus of production stands in the same relation to the superior central organization, as does a local post office to the
office of the postmaster general. The second pattern (we may call it the Hindenburg or German pattern) nominally and seemingly
preserves private ownership of markets, prices, wages, and interest rates. There are, however, no longer entrepreneurs, but only
shop managers (Betriebsfuhrer in the terminology of the Nazi legislation)."2
Not without reason were the basic forms of economic centralism, later raised to an absolute by
the Bolsheviks, determined and tested in practice by the pre-revolutionary Russian governments, both Tsarist and Provisional
(led by a man who was made a hero in the West – leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Russia Alexander Kerensky). The
First World War led to further militarization and centralization of the Russian economy and society. Leading Bolsheviks-V.I.
Lenin, N.I. Bukharin and A.M. Larin were watching with sympathy how the German military-economic machine was replacing the market
mechanism. They argued that the combination of this type of economic organization with the communist party in power is socialism.
"Here we have the last word in modern large-scale capitalist technology and planned organization", wrote Lenin.
The First World War silenced critics of statism and interventionism in Russia and elsewhere.
It prepared a stage for the approaching disaster. "Champions of militarism are consistent in asking for the establishment of
socialism. The whole nation should be organized as a community of warriors in which the noncombatants have no other task than
that of supplying the fighting forces with all they need."3 A student of Austrian school of economics, Russian economist A.A.
Bogdanov warned during the war that communism is above all ..."a special form of social consumption: authoritarian regulatory
organization of mass parasitism and destruction".
These warnings came too late-determination of Marxist doctrinaires coupled with the apathy
of the ruling elite of the Tsarist regime prepared conditions for the deadliest experiment in world history.
Upon taking power in November 1917 the Bolsheviks were busy implementing the orthodox
Marxist vision of communism. They tried to introduce the direct power of the workers at all levels of management. The Bolsheviks
tried to construct a whole pyramid of organs of workers control – from the enterprise to the entire economy-as institutions of
centralized management, as well as abolish private property and money. But within a few months, if not weeks, this approach
demonstrated its complete bankruptcy: the country was fast sliding into disaster; millions perished and it was impossible to keep
peasant's majority of Russia under control with collapsing economy.
Utopia failed and Kremlin leaders have chosen the only possible way of managing economy under
socialism – direct government coercion based on the principle from the top down. The absolute command economy was created.
Management of production and distribution was performed solely by the central government. With the absolute "thought monopoly" of Marxism as understood by Lenin and his comrades in the Kremlin government, enforced by mass deportations and slaughter of
"bourgeois intellectuals", Marxist-Leninist ideologues tried to find a basis for a possibility of a Great Leap Forward regardless
of the state's resources and capabilities. These ideologues – Felix Dzerzhinsky, Leo Trotsky, Josef Stalin and others put forward
a set of arguments according to which the plan was replacing laws of supply and demand, "mutually beneficial exchanges" under
capitalism should give way to direct distribution by the government, money was being turned into accounting signs and the sales
process into a purely formal operation of the said distribution. Centrally planned Investment based on unrestrained emission
policy and the official campaigns against "duplication and parallelism" resulted in formation of the huge government monopolies
solely responsible for the production of certain commodities. Competition became nonexistent. As a result, prices were calculated
in a bureaucratic way of "cost accounting" (whatever the "cost" means in the centrally planned economy without competition) and
were not even supposed to reflect the laws of supply and demand. There was even a period, as in 1919-1920, talk began of the
imminent abolition of money altogether and transition to distribution purely in kind. Both the actions and the talk of communist
leaders put the country on the verge of complete economic catastrophe within three years of the beginning of socialist experiment.
Lenin introduced the first series of reforms known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) in March 1921.
It was officially treated as a temporary retreat from Marxist methods of the "construction of communism". It also signified the
pattern of behavior of the communist leaders-reforms would be introduced as a last resort for saving communism, not abandoning it (as the Western well-wishers would try to portray it). Liberalization of economic life under NEP coupled with the introduction of the gold standard revived economic activity and led to the fastest rates of economic growth experienced during the last ninety years of Russian history. It could not last for long: the rapid growth of the private sector in those branches of the economy in which it was permitted, and its evident competitive advantages, represented a political threat to the regime. Realization of this threat by Stalin and other communist leaders led to the abandonment of NEP in the late 1920s and creation of the system of Soviet socialism as it did survive (with minor modifications) until Gorbachev's perestroika.
This system was based on practically complete destruction of the consumer market (rationing was reintroduced not only for means of
production but also consumer goods), and the creation of non-economic institutions of compulsion to work (mass repression providing
cheap labor, and a ban on peasants leaving collective farms, supplemented later by a similar ban on jobs and residency changes for
urban residents. Most Western historians believe that Stalin's terror took place mainly in the cities, against intellectuals and
political opponents. But the great purges were really an assault on the countryside. Over half of all executions took place in rural
areas. The liquidation of the kulaks ended up in ten million of them deported to Siberia where most of them died. In Ukraine alone
Stalin starved to death over 7 million peasants. Bloodthirsty communist leaders ended up deporting women, children, and crippled
people who were no threat to the government. Often authorities had a different agenda, like clearing out people they might have to
feed.
Private Property
The most fundamental institution of the market economy is a regime of private property rights.
This is generally the defining difference between wealthy, stable, prosperous societies and poor, decimated nations. Describing
the "social function" of property rights Mises wrote:
"Under capitalism, private property is the consummation of the self-determination of the consumers... In the market
society the proprietors of capital and land can enjoy their property only by employing it for the satisfaction of other people's
wants. They must serve the consumers in order to have any advantage from what is their own. The very fact that they own means of
production forces them to submit to the wishes of the public. Ownership is an asset only for those who know how to employ it in the
best possible way for the benefit of consumers. It is a social function"4. The private property, in both the narrow and broad senses
of the word, provides the key to the fullest possible satisfaction of people's needs as well as to the emergence of political and
legal institutions that guarantee liberty5.
The most prominent erosion of property rights happened in the twentieth century. This process
that started under communism, fascism and National Socialism, was continued under Western welfare state by pervasive regulations,
confiscatory taxation, affirmative action and other government programs undermining the institution of private property. The history
of Communism, Fascism and National Socialism supplies credible evidence that abolition of personal rights and freedoms in
totalitarian states goes hand in hand with curtailment, if not outright abolition, of private property. "In an effort to
differentiate themselves from the nationalist, anti-Communist totalitarian regimes that sprang up in inter war Europe, regimes with
which their own regime had embarrassingly much in common and often competed for the same constituencies, Communist propagandists
redefined the term "fascism" to designate any government opposed to communism – specifically, Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's
Germany, but, when the occasion called for it, also the United States and the other democracies"6.
It was and still is common in academia to identify the Communists as the Left and the Nazis as
the extreme Right, as if they stood on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. This definitions were first coined by Stalin
himself at the 7th Congress of the Communist International in 1935. To put these regimes in their true perspective we should admit
that they are as various versions of the same socialist ideology. The economic policies of Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany
resembled the "state socialism" which Lenin wanted to institute in Soviet Russia upon coming to power, under which private
enterprise would work for the government – an idea Lenin was forced to abandon under the pressure of the "Left Communists". Under
both fascist and communist regimes government bureaucracy completely controls the production. It decides what shall be produced, how
much, for whom and how.
The difference between the systems is that the German and Italian patterns did indeed allow – or,
more accurately, tolerated – private property. However, it was "property" in a peculiar and very restricted sense – not the
virtually untrammeled private ownership of Roman law and nineteen-century Europe, but rather conditional possession, under which
the state, the owner of last resort, reserved to itself the right to interfere with and even confiscate assets which, in its
judgment, were unsatisfactorily used. But in fact the governments of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany directed production decisions,
curbed entrepreneurship and the labor market, and determined wages and interest rates by centralized authority similar to that in
the communist states.
Communist Russia was the first country to completely officially abolish property rights,
which were declared "a sanctification of capitalist oppression and exploitation". "Lenin pursued the expropriation of private
property with fanatical zeal and unhesitating brutality... When the massive expropriation was completed, the state sector of the
USSR was officially reported to account for 99.3 percent of the country's national income'7The results of this action can be
considered as the worse tragedy experienced by humanity.
It is beyond the abilities of economic analysis to calculate the opportunity cost of the
socialist experiment in Russia, but the human toll is estimated by Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at over sixty million
people who perished in a dreadful Gulag during Stalin's collectivization, purges, campaigns against "unearned" incomes and other
devilish experiments. The elimination of private property ensured the security of the one-party apparatus... Along with political
police, endowed with unlimited powers over the lives of Soviet citizens, the monopoly on resources and employment was what
made possible the absolute totalitarian killer state. Central planners exercised a total control over production and distribution.
Competition was officially done with in the 1930s with formation of the system of the industrial ministries solely responsible
for the production of certain groups of commodities. The market price system, necessary for efficient economy, ceased to exist in
Soviet official economy hiding in a fiercely prosecuted black market. Efficient allocation of resources became impossible due to
the lack of price information.
The only way to make this mechanism work, as Stalin and his associates realized,
was to resort to terror. Fear was implanted into the people's minds and it replaced normal economic incentives. It was not a
coincidence that the Soviet economy would achieve highest rates of growth during the period of Stalinist purges, and mass terror.
The market was replaced by a system of commands based on the mechanism of the central planning and state ownership. The final
goal of Marx: the social anarchy of production gives place to a social regulation of production upon a definite plan... was
finally achieved. It led to severe dislocation and waste of resources, widespread shortages, mass loss of human life and frustration
of the populations.
This system survived relatively intact until economic reforms of 1965 associated with Nikita
Khrushchev's campaign of "Destalinization". Economic discussion encouraged by this campaign since the mid-1950s led to a series
of proposals put forward by the reform-minded economists: A.M. Birman, E.G. Lieberman, L.V. Kantorovich who persuaded the USSR
leadership to understand the necessity of reforming the Soviet economic order. Younger participants of this discussion L.I. Abalkin,
A.G. Aganbegyan, N.I. Petrakov, B.V. Rakitsky and others twenty years later would become close confidants of Mikhail Gorbachev and
the economic architects of perestroika. "8The key feature of their proposals was the thesis that it was essential to abandon using
the level of fulfillment of a directive plan as the basis for assessing the results of the enterprises economic activities... It was
shown that it was precisely Assessment according to plan (i.e., payment of incentives according to fulfillment and over fulfillment
of targets) that prompted enterprises to try to distort economic information..."9. Instead they proposed a series of measures to
introduce some features of the oxymoronic "market socialism": profit, reorientation of the incentive system to indicators measuring
sales of output, that is to say, recognizing that the product is needed by the customer, abandonment of centralized direct funding
of enterprises and introduction of self-financing. Real issues of property rights and the impossibility of economic calculation
without the market price system were not even mentioned in these discussions and proposals. Thus, the reformers failed to reconsider
the role of a series of fundamental features of the Soviet economic system. Of course, these features could hardly have been
overcome in practice while remaining within the framework of the communist economic and political regime. These reforms also showed
futility of reforming socialism, the absurdity of a Third way between slavery and freedom that still occupies many minds in Western academia. Answering these academics Mises wrote:
"Private ownership of the means of production (market economy or capitalism) and public ownership of the means of
production (socialism or communism or "planning") can be neatly distinguished. Each of these systems of society's economic
organization is open to a precise and unambiguous description and definition. The can never be confounded with one another; they
cannot be mixed or combined; no gradual transition leads from one of them to another; they are mutually incompatible"10.
By creating a system which redistributed resources between the small number of firms that were
profitable (whatever this means under the central planning) and the vast majority of firms that were unprofitable, the Soviet party
and government apparatchiks suppressed any attempt of the enterprise managers to become less dependent on the state planning
mechanism. The system punished efficient enterprises and supported the losers. However, the masses, not bureaucrats, bore the
brunt of state waste, as the bureaucrats at the subsistence level set the price of labor in the USSR. The absurdity of the system
reached grotesque proportions with the introduction of the concept of profit into socialist economizing. The profit, under these
"reforms" became a planned category, calculated as a normative percentage of the costs. This "high cost – high profit" approach was
one of the catalysts for the collapse of the system during Gorbachev's perestroika.
The first sign of the coming Soviet economic collapse at the end of 1970s and the beginning of
1980s, was an urgent necessity to increase state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises. Huge losses imminent to the non-working
system were covered by foreign currency obtained from the overseas sales of oil, gas and other natural resources and credits readily
provided by the Western governments and banks. Since the mid-1970s over $300 billion were spent in this way. The Kremlin bureaucrats
to purchase goods in the world market in order to make up for domestic production failures used these hard currency reserves.
By the mid-1980s, the deterioration of the Soviet economy reached a critical point. More than
50 percent of state business enterprises were permanently unprofitable and survived due to the huge subsidies, while other
agricultural sector required an infusion of more than 100 billion rubles in the years 1986-1988 to support the feudal collective
farm system based on state ownership of land and forced labor. Productivity declined and shortages (as well as corresponding
rationing of consumer goods) became widespread. With the Election (by eleven Politburo members) of Mikhail Gorbachev as a general
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 reformers got a new hope.
Gorbachev, without himself knowing or wishing it, gave the process of change a powerful impulse,
which determined the future development not only of his own country but also of other states and nations enslaved in the "Evil
Empire". Being a devoted communist, Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to solve problems of declining productivity and negative economic
growth of the 1980s by introducing reforms which would put the USSR on par with the developed market economies of the West. "The
new Soviet leaders, whose political youth coincided with the time of hope under Khrushchev, believed themselves to be well prepared
to cope with ambitious economic and social tasks"11. In this way the first stage of perestroika was more similar to the spirit of
Rapid industrialization of the 1930s and the "Overtake and surpass capitalism" slogans of Khrushchev's reforms of the 1960s. The
following collapse of socialist economic system was an unforeseen consequence of Gorbachev's actions.
Perestroika was the last and most far-reaching attempt to reform Soviet-type socialism while
preserving its fundamental features. "The socialist choice of the people", as Gorbachev in his time liked to say, "Should be
cherished and preserved". At the same time perestroika led to the breakthrough out of socialism and laid the foundations for the
post-socialist (post-communist) development of the country. This breakthrough out of socialism had nothing to do with ill-devised
and badly implemented economic reforms of Gorbachev's confidants L.I. Abalkin, A.G. Aganbegyan, and others who could not go beyond
Marxist political economy. The core issues of private property and the market were not even mentioned by these "reformers". The true
reason for the demise of socialism and the Soviet empire was the weakening of political control and removal of coercion from the
system glued only by coercion. With perestroika, the ailing regime lost its repressive impetus and the "socialist economic
mechanism", built upon repression, fell like a house of cards.
"Economic affairs, political methods, – immediate predecessor of Gorbachev, General Secretary of
the Communist Party of the USSR Konstantin Chernenko wrote as far back as 1984, and this formula, as perestroika has proved, clearly
and accurately reflected the essence of the Soviet economic system. When the political prop on which the national economic organism
rested was suddenly weakened, that is when the centralized party system of appointments and controls was relaxed without any market
stabilizers and constraints to replace them, and the economic process became uncontrollable.
The end of 1991 marked the collapse of both-the Soviet economic system and the Soviet Union as a
unitary state. This period was not just the beginning of the next phase of the reformation of Soviet society that started in
mid-1980s. There had occurred two radical changes that had long-term and all-embracing economic and political consequences. First,
the policy of late-socialist reformism had been replaced with one aimed at solving post-communist transformation problems. Second,
the center of gravity of this process had shifted onto the level of the former Soviet republics, which had just become independent
states.
The major lesson to be learned from the spectacular failure of the command system is that it
failed due to internal contradictions, not due to human error. Subsequent generations, attracted by the appealing but illusory
features of the statist command system-equality, job rights, and managed growth-may conclude that the system itself was sound.
In this flawed but popular view, the Soviet managers, from the late 1920s through the early 1990s simply could not do it right
due some technical or cultural factors. Such a conclusion could lead to a repetition of the deadly experiment with results that
would perhaps not be foreseen by future generations. We should all be thankful to the Soviets because they have proved conclusively
that socialism doesn't work. "No one can say they didn't have enough power or enough bureaucracy or enough planners or they didn't
go far enough", – concluded Paul Craig Roberts.
Despite the recent collapse of socialism and communism in Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe,
socialism is still alive and growing in Western academia. Even today the existence of the dozen American Marxian journals and the
availability of more than 400 American university courses given per semester on Marxism proves that "the only lesson of history is
that it does not teach us anything". Thousands of Western academics belong to a thriving industry of Marxist studies. The gap
created by the collapse of communism in the East which put to screeching halt Marxian studies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union and disbanded numerous institutions of Marxism-Leninism there, was immediately filled by Marxist scholars of the West. Another
sad legacy of Marxism is the mind set of certain people both in the East and West who started to believe that only the Big State
could cure economic ills and achieve social justice.
The failure of socialism in Russia, enormous suffering and hardship of the people in all of the
socialist countries is a powerful warning against socialism, statism and interventionism in the West because the "most audacious
attempt in human history to abolish private property has ended in disaster. It is unlikely to be repeated as long as the memory of
that calamity remains fresh"12.
Post-Communist Transition
The major prerequisite for a successful transition from a command economy to economic freedom
and efficiency is private property and private decision-making in the allocation of resources. There can be no suspicion on the
part of prospective buyers that any industry is being propped up through subsidies or special privileges that distort the prices
of shares, products, or services. An intensive and extensive economic exchange cannot exist or last very long without confidence
in the stability and reliability of the legal institutions.
The widespread frustration with the "free market" reforms of Yeltsin's and then Putin's governments in Russia led to the situation when every new announcement of impeding reform causes perverse public responses and new legislation passed, ostensibly to increase freedom, only increases opportunities for fines and bribes. All economic and fiscal legislation in this period has been absolutely inconsistent with legality. Every law that has promised stability in taxation and established rules of economic conduct has been overtly revoked to the preservation of the willful government expropriations. Even with the introduction of 13 percent flat tax in Russia in 2000 there was not much of a tax relief with payroll and other taxes constituting over 50 percent of the national income.
The new class of Russian entrepreneurs is on its way to becoming a rent-seeking private bureaucracy.
The source of bureaucratization of private enterprise in Russia is the same as everywhere else – the destruction of the profit
motive by government regulations and taxation. Current economic and political developments in Russia are taking the path-towards
even more government intervention, away from Russian, but towards the German pattern of socialism, so well described by Ludwig von Mises, coupled with totalitarian political regime of a rising Russian dictator-ex-KGB officer Vladimir Putin.
Von Mises pointed out that there could be "no gradual transition" between two distinctively different economic systems – capitalism and communism.13 Murray N. Rothbard also believed that "gradualism and piecemeal change
should be eschewed in favor of a radical and immediate overhaul". Today it is obvious even to the World Bank bureaucrats that
Austrians de-socialization prescriptions are right. According to the World Bank's study of eight formerly communist states –
Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan – "the countries that have been the most successful
in reorienting trade and stabilizing the downward spiral in trade and output are those that reformed the fastest (such as Baltics)".
It is also obvious from the Russian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh experience; however, that gradual "reform" provides a
convenient excuse to the vested interest of bureaucrats to change nothing at all. Huge government, industrial and agricultural
bureaucracies together with their counterparts in the organized crime are the true beneficiaries of the "gradual change" under
which any meaningful reform is reduced to mere rhetoric and lip service.
The pace of reforms played a critical part in swift transition undertaken by some post communist
nations. The "Big Bang" policy blamed by the "socialists of all parties" as a failure produced viable open economies in Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. On the other hand, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, all practicing
gradualism, experienced "shock without therapy" and became major recipients of the international welfare system run by the US
government under the aegis of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations and all its sixteen "sister"
organizations. The well-known Index of Economic Freedom that put Russia in 134th place out of 181 in respect of economic
freedom.
Privatization
The essence of socialism is public ownership and without dismantling this system none of any
"reforms" would ever work. Numerous Russian governments' programs for "privatization" did not lead to private property, or to
private owner, but were intended to create "mixed", collective property owner, essentially leaving property rights as a monopoly
of the state. Some of these "privatization programs" were aimed at providing the opportunity for the workforce to obtain 51% of
the shares in its enterprise virtually without paying. The net result of this scheme usually would be accumulation of equity
and power by managers many of whom became real owners of Russian industry. Other programs, presumably promoting a balance "between
economic efficiency and social justice" (whatever it means in Russian bureaucratic jargon, – Y.M.) would lead to squandering of
the state assets by bureaucrats"14, Even a "radical reformer" Mr. Gaidar while at the helm of the Russian government, repudiated
privatization as "unnecessary". His economic program, as he put it himself, was directed at... "the restructuring of the state
regulatory mechanism" (whatever this means). "We cannot link the restructuring of regulatory mechanism to full-scale privatization.
If we did, we simply wouldn't live enough to see it". After eleven years of announced economic reforms Russia continues to possess
the largest and most ineffective public sector in the world. Existence of this public sector is the chief cause of the low
standard of living in Russia. Moreover, without defined and secure property rights any numbers on the size of the private sector
produced today by the Russian government as a part of their IMF reporting are meaningless. The fact that private ownership
dominates the most efficient economies of the West point unmistakably to the economic inferiority of the state or collective-based
ownership solution.
De-Militarization. One of the major obstacles on the path to freer economy and society is the
high level of militarization of Russian economy and society. Russian government, while still wasting scarce resources on development
of highly sophisticated systems of weapons and space exploration, completely ignores basic human needs of their citizens.
Foreign Investment
Western economic aid transfers are essentially non-economic in nature and represent purely
political decisions motivated by open and hidden agenda of donor countries. Private foreign investment requires a hospitable
economic environment. At a minimum, here are the signs to look for: extensive and radical transition plans; provisions for
repatriation of earnings; complementary institutional infrastructures; mutually acceptable prices and terms of contract; the
prospects of satisfactory financial and economic results, and favorable cultural environment. "The more successful a transition
economy is in solving the tasks of reforming the economy, the higher the level of investment, including the foreign investors,
will be. It is no surprise that "the leader terms of foreign direct investment per head of population is Estonia followed by
Hungary, i.e. countries which succeeded most in freeing their economies.
The short-term possibilities for foreign investment in the Russian economy remain quite limited.
The business climate will remain risky as long as investors need to worry about economic instability, lack of reliable currency,
political conflicts and uncertainty about the future of the Russian empire. It is evident that the ways to enhance the dynamic
economic development of Russia are to attract foreign capital as well as to secure access to the modern know-how and methods of
management. This should be done through direct investment by foreign private-sector institutions that can be attracted only by a
favorable policy environment. In the long run there are objective prerequisites for foreign capital investment: a skilled labor
force, an abundance of natural resources and land. Foreign investments are more likely to be made in economies that are
market-oriented and genuinely desire direct foreign investment. Tough competition on the world market for capital among both
developed and developing market economies for foreign capital has already prompted liberalization of tax and investment regimes,
tax holidays, the sharing the risk capital by way of joint venture arrangements, etc.
The collapse of the last major empire-the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its worldwide
consequences were not yet fully understood by contemporaries. Countless books and articles shed more darkness than light on the
most dramatic event of the outgoing century-the rise and fall of socialism. Both scientific apologists and lay sympathizers of
socialism in the West are trying to persuade us to believe that the world collapse of communism resulted from the human error
rather than a systemic failure. The radical Left even questions the very fact of existence of socialism in Russia during the
last eighty years. The most bizarre explanations of the fall of real world socialism provided by the numerous Marxists in the US
academia, unparalleled only to the Lenin-Stalin's propaganda, is that we, actually, witnessed the collapse of something they
call the "State Capitalism". So, according to this "logic" poor capitalism "failed again", this time was ruining Mother Russia (!).
The reality is different. The facts, including those in von Mises book, point to socialism as the most destructive economic system
based on non-economic "incentives" like fear and coercion. "The characteristic feature of this age of destructive wars and social
disintegration is the revolt against economics,"15, – stated Ludwig von Mises.
In Russia alone 61,911,00016 people were exterminated as a part of the "great socialist
experiment". The spread of the anti-capitalistic mentality in the twentieth century has brought enormous suffering and hardship
of the people in all socialist countries, greatly reduced standard of living and quality of life in mixed economies and is a
powerful warning against socialism, statism and interventionism in the West. Today Russian people are trying to reassess their
historical and cultural identity, return back to economic reasoning. Translation of the great "Human Action" Into Russian is a
significant contribution in this process.
A Clear Alternative
The experiences of political and economic transitions in the formerly socialist states
unequivocally point to the fact that Austrian school of economics was absolutely right in defining the factors necessary to
achieve a successful transition to a market economy. These factors: secured property rights and the rule of law are the most
essential for economic success. Success stories in Central and Eastern Europe: Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic,
Latvia and Lithuania are all small and now are economically free nations. Moreover, Balts, Poles and Slovenians expanded
considerably faster than the 2% – to 3%-a-year global average. Major ingredients of success were radical privatization and
cessation of sending financial and other resources to Moscow or Belgrade or some other imperial capital. These small countries
spectacularly outperformed large ones like Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan-multinational states with bloated bureaucracies
disrespecting property rights, huge public sector, confiscatory tax systems, high cost of military and other wasteful government
expenditures and widespread nepotism, crime and corruption. There is a strong correlation between economic freedom and rates of
economic growth in formerly socialist countries. Relatively free Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are boasting annual
growth rates of 5.9, 4.1 and 4.0 percent respectively, while overregulated statist regimes of Ukraine, Belarus or Tajikistan
are showing negative growth of – 25, – 17.1 and -15 percent respectively.
In fact, Estonia was recently ranked fourth in the world in terms of its economic freedom by
the World Index of Economic Freedom, which is a report compiled by a group of economists headed by James Gwartney and published
annually by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. This small Baltic country surpasses most of the free world in
providing markets with an established rule of law, as well as an overall stable legal environment. Additionally, Lithuania and
Latvia are both following the Estonian example. However, this unregulated economic environment is not without its detractors.
Statists in the West for its "undue tax advantages" and "unyielding macroeconomic policies" are now criticizing the Estonian model
of reform. Indeed, it is interesting to note that all three Baltic countries have the highest rates of economic growth and lowest
inflation rates in Europe.
The main problems these growing nations face today are the ones created by their socialist
oppressors in the Kremlin. In June 1940, Stalin carried out an open and contemptuous aggression against Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania based upon a secret agreement with Nazi Germany. His regime occupied and mutilated three independent and proud countries
in violation of all provisions of international law while mocking the existing "peacekeeping" system of the League of Nations. With
the blessings of Roosevelt and Churchill, the Soviets completely destroyed the constitutional order, national institutions, and
prosperous economies of the Baltic States. An occupation army, along with the NKVD (predecessor of the infamous KGB), carried out
genocide, numerous war crimes, and various other crimes against civilians. Along the way, they destroyed the institution of private
property – the basis of any civilized society – and deliberately annihilated the national cultures of all three countries. With the
goal of Russification of the Baltic States, Stalin and his successors – Khrushchev and Brezhnev – changed the ethnic make-up of the
Baltic States via massive and forced migration of Russians, Ukrainians and other Soviet citizens into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia,
in order to destroy the cultural homogeneity of these nations.
Those individuals that were not integrated were exterminated. Mass executions and deportations
to Siberia resulted in at least 1.5 million Poles and Lithuanians being murdered between 1939 and 1956. This massive scale of
Soviet genocide, in both countries, is a story practically unknown in the West. In 1939, 3.1 million people lived in Lithuania. By
1952, only 2.3 million remained. Every third Lithuanian was either murdered by the NKVD or German SS thugs, or ended up perishing
in a dreadful Gulag. Poland lost one in every six adults.
In its recent statement, the Riigikogu – Estonian Parliament – was the first authoritative
institution to declare "the Soviet Union's communist regime which committed these crimes, and the Soviet Union's organizations
which implemented such regimes as the NKVD, the NKGB, the KGB, and any tribunals or special meetings, as well as death squads,
peoples' defense battalions, and their activities" to be criminal. The Riigikogu emphasizes "responsibility for the crimes against
humanity, and the war crimes carried out in Estonia by the repressive organs of the Soviet Union in Estonia lies with the ruling
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its organization, the Estonian Communist Party." In declaring the communist occupation
regime's institutions and organizations to be criminal, the Riigikogu is standing tall among other parliaments and international
organizations. Following the example, many members of the Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments are trying to introduce similar
resolutions.
The crimes of the Soviets in the Baltic States were but part of the oppressive activities
carried out by socialist totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century. The danger of repetitions of such crimes has not
disappeared. Although the Soviet Union exists no more, Russia has declared itself the heir of the USSR, using its state symbols:
the anthem and Communist Party holidays. Mr. Putin declared, as a state holiday, the restoration of Day of the Soviet Army –
February 23. On this day in 1918, Lenin and Trotsky signed a decree creating the Red Army. Russia also inherited the Soviet KGB,
which it renamed the FSB, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air Force with over 7,000 nuclear weapons; a huge and illegal chemical and
biological arsenal; and a military with at least 1.5 million soldiers that it has ruthlessly used in Turkmenistan, Georgia, and
Moldova, as well as against its own citizens in Chechnya.
President Putin, whose professional life revolved around the KGB where he was a career spy,
has definitely made the restoration of Russia's superpower status a priority, as he has so stated on several occasions. Under
President Putin's leadership, any hopes for freedom and prosperity in Russia are being betrayed as he has effectively wiped out all
voices of dissent on national TV, and is steadily moving towards authoritarian rule in other spheres. At one lavish Kremlin
reception, he raised a toast to Stalin, and referred to the people of Chechnya as "dark-skinned terrorists who should be prosecuted
everywhere, even in latrines and killed there." Putin, using the words of Booker T. Washington, is a "typical problem profiteer" –
he thrives on problems whether real, imaginary or fabricated. The war in Chechnya, the bombing of apartments in Moscow and Southern
Russia, and the Kaliningrad issue give him excuse to crack down on the freedom of speech, harass his political opponents, and
increase the power of the state as well as his own. Yet unlike his predecessors, Messrs. Gorbachev and Yeltsin, he understands that
the only way to restore the superpower status of Russia is to rebuild it economically. Under the guidance of market reformers, like
Andrei Illarionov, his chief economic advisor, the Putin government introduced a flat 13% tax on income to replace a sophisticated
and confiscatory tax system that emerged under President Yeltsin. Another economic reformer, Minister for Economic Development
German Gref, proposed some small business-friendly reforms that should reduce tax and regulatory burdens for small businesses.
In foreign policy, however, the Kremlin continues to treat formerly Soviet-occupied states
(including the Baltic states) as "the Near Abroad." Today, one can witness the ethnic quandary left behind by Soviet socialism –
problems with integration of Russian and other non-indigenous migrants to the Baltic countries. These problems are being exploited
by Kremlin with the goal to turn ethnic Russians in Baltic countries into pawns of its expansionist policy17.
Kremlin embraced another Stalin fan – the infamous Byelorussian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko –
and keeps its troops in Belarus, propping up and securing his regime. The Russian government continues to manipulate gas and oil
supplies to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other former republics to ensure pro-Russian policies from the Commonwealth of
Independent States, which it dominates.
Kaliningrad
The most visible problem existing in the "post-Soviet space" is the issue of Kaliningrad.
This is a Russian enclave completely cut off from the Russian mainland, much as Alaska is cut off from the contiguous 48 states.
This geographical separation could create a situation similar to Danzig in the 1930s or West Berlin during the Cold War – with the
unpleasant and potentially explosive problem of military transit rights.
Another dilemma is that Kaliningrad has become the crime capital of the Baltic area.
The city hosts vast networks of organized crime originating in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Caucasus. Kaliningrad, the center
of organized crime as well as FSB (the new name for the infamous KGB) activities, has become a nasty thorn that threatens the peace
and stability of the whole region.
Historically, Russia has no more of a claim on the former Konigsberg than it does on Paris. Kaliningrad was called Konigsberg
until it was occupied by the Soviets in 1944, and Stalin renamed it after his henchman, Soviet "President" Mikhail Kalinin who,
among other crimes, signed decrees for deportations and mass executions of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians in 1940.
Prior to 1944, Konigsberg was a part of Germany and the capital of Prussia.
Konigsberg's geographical location is one of the reasons it was included in the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Germany acquired Danzig (now Gdansk), creating "The Corridor", which stretched to Konigsberg from Germany
through Northeastern Poland and into what is now Lithuania, and then to Klaipeda, which the Germans called Memel. All of this
territory, except the Kaliningrad enclave, has been turned over to Poland and Lithuania. Only Kaliningrad remains, a rotting,
rusting reminder of the Stalinist-Soviet era.
Kaliningrad is the last remaining renamed city surviving from the Stalinist era.
For instance, Stalingrad has been renamed Volgograd; Sverdlovsk is now Ekaterinburg; Leningrad has been returned to St. Petersburg;
and many other cities have reverted to their pre-Soviet names. Only Kaliningrad remains as a constant reminder of the
Stalinist-Soviet era to the people who endured and suffered from it more than anyone else – the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians,
and Poles.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was faced with the issue of having to
absorb more than a million of its occupation forces from East Germany, as well as other troops from Central and Eastern Europe.
Destitute Russia made every effort to keep the troops away from the mainland. Indeed, it is a generally accepted fact that Russia
paid Germany to keep discharged Russian military personnel and Russian expatriates in Germany, rather than having to face their
return to Russia. In addition, military installations in the Baltic States – the Soviet submarine facilities at Klaipeda, Lithuania
and Paldiski, Estonia, and the Soviet Navy bases at Liepojia, Latvia and Tallinn, Estonia – were also evacuated to Kaliningrad.
Even the Soviet Space Radar Site at Skrunda, Latvia was relocated in Western Belarus. Today, Kaliningrad hosts the headquarters of
the Russian Baltic Fleet, and according to Western intelligence sources, it is also a base for nuclear weapons. It is quite true to
say that the enclave, as a whole, hosts a dense military presence.
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, does not want to remove the military buildup from Kaliningrad
since he considers its use to be two-fold: a military policy tool in dealing with the Balts and Poles, and a valuable bargaining
chip with the West. The strategic importance of the Kaliningrad enclave increases immensely while it becomes even more isolated
due to a complete economic collapse of its economy. In 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested that Poland let Russia
have "a bit of highway on its territory" to facilitate Russian military access to Kaliningrad. The proposal was vehemently rejected
by Poland, and the Russians backed off.
Now Russia's major target is Lithuania, a country with a considerable Russian population.
In fact, Russian anti-West propaganda in Lithuania dominates both Russian and Lithuanian language press and TV, creating an
atmosphere of uncertainty and panic amidst many Russians residing here. And in marked contrast to his predecessor Yeltsin, Putin
has affirmed Russia's ties with sootechestvenniki (compatriots) in the Near Abroad, stressing that although ethnic Russians may
be scattered among fifteen formerly Soviet republics, they make up a unified people.
According to Sergei Glotov, a member of the Russian Duma, there is an existing threat against
Russia from Lithuania and other Baltic states that is manifested by the fact that Poland has doubled its military personnel in
its border region with Russia since 1994 to 22,000, while Lithuania has concentrated 3,000 troops on its border with the enclave.
Imagine! The great and mighty Russia feeling threatened by 3,000 troops! The fact that the Russians make these statements does
not mean they are true. There is a Russian army in the Kaliningrad enclave at least 50 times (!) larger than all Polish and
Lithuanian presence combined. It is these countries that should be nervous about Russia's presence on their borders. For it was
the Soviets who destroyed a prosperous and independent Lithuania in 1940, and committed genocide in the Baltic States and Eastern
Poland in proportions that would dwarf the Nazis.
Beginning in 1940, when the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania)
began, followed in 1941 by the German occupation, and again in 1944 by the Soviet occupation, over a third of Lithuanians, a fourth
of Latvians, and a fifth of the Estonian population was forced to leave their homeland by the Soviet and German occupation
authorities. Interestingly, the crimes of the German National Socialist regime have been condemned internationally while the
horrendous crimes of the Soviet Socialist regime have not been similarly denounced. In fact, they are even praised in Moscow as
the "liberation" of the Balts from the "bourgeoisie" first and the Germans second. The Secret Protocol to Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
of 1939 formalized the Soviet grab of Eastern Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, originally planned by Josef Stalin and Adolf
Hitler. Russia never apologized, let alone compensated Baltic and other nations for the genocide committed on their territories,
horrors and the irreparable economic, ecological and cultural damage that the Soviet occupation brought with it. In fact, the
Russian government until today sticks to the macabre fiction that the Soviet takeover of the three Baltic States was "voluntary."
In fact, they are even praised in Moscow as the "liberation" of the Balts from the "bourgeoisie" first and the Germans second.
Author was absolutely stunned by an absolutely unreformed Stalinist version of history defended by Russian Consul General in
Klaipeda, Lithuania V. Torshin while debating him in a local university.
Conclusions
A market economy cannot function without a legal structure that is consistent with
its underlying institutions of private property and freedom of contract. The developed market economy can evolve on the basis of
institutionalization of the rule of law where the legal code is primarily directed toward defending person and property against
invasion, either by the state or private parties.
Governmental decisions must be rooted in the consensus of the governed, acting through
structures designed to prevent individual oppression or political tyranny, and procedures are subject to appraisal by an
independent judiciary rendering judgments based on law. It stands in contrast to decisions based on arbitrary fiat of power,
political rent seeking or personal gain. Thus, government maintains a framework of security and order within which liberty can be
secured. Individual rights of person and property are treated as normatively prior to government, as standards those take
precedence. Governments are instituted among people so as to secure and protect those rights. Obviously not only the U.S.
government, but also the governments of majority of the modern states are as far from this ideal as can be imagined. Limitations
of property rights are imposed in these nations by the welfare state policies and regulatory requirements. The true burden of
these requirements is shared jointly by owners in the form of reduced market value of their property, by employees of the
regulated industries in the form of lower real wages, and by customers – in the form of higher prices and less choice. Indeed,
the entire economy is harmed to the extent that regulation reduces natural comparative advantage, as well as the real growth
potential of the economy. The assault on property rights, points out von Mises, is not always apparent, because it is carried out
in the names of "common good" or "social interests" "converting them into a critique of the capitalist system or of the conduct
of entrepreneurs"18.
Complying with regulatory requirements entails both explicit and implicit costs. Explicit
costs include the resources used to comply with the regulations, such as the costs of hiring additional employees to process
government paperwork. The implicit costs of regulations are much higher – it involves the foregone opportunities from diverting
resources into less efficient activities. Both of these regulatory costs are often overlooked in the fog of rhetoric of the Newspeak
generated by the vested interests. Usually this rhetoric would use (and abuse) the words like social justice, compassion, greed,
environmental quality, wildlife conservation, consumer protection, etc.
Property rights are the foundation of human peace and coexistence. They are indispensable for
economic growth. It is imperative we understand this issue if we are to survive as a social species. And not only survive, but, to
grow and evolve as humans in need of order and the brotherhood of world community.
The most fundamental institution of the market economy is a regime of private property rights.
Property rights are moral and legal sanctions to own, control, and possess wealth created by men's own efforts. Without property
rights economic growth or human progress are impossible. The linkage between human effort, the resulting product, and well-being
must be secure and stable for economic activity to flourish.
Economic and political systems of different nations differ in the amount of planning they do
and in the extent to which they restrict private ownership of property. Wherever you see shifting, arbitrary or unstable property
rights, you see poor decimated societies like in Belarus, Moldova, Turkmenistan. The absence of the property rights being "the
Mother" of human rights inevitably leads to negation of every other right starting with the first right – a right to life. The
utmost importance of property rights for human dignity and prosperity cannot be overestimated. Unfortunately it is still far from
being understood by the majority of people.
1 Murray N. Rothbard, The Essential von Mises. In: Ludwig von Mises, Planning For Freedom and Sixteen Other essays and
Addresses. Fourth Edition – enlarged. Libertarian Press, South Holland (IL), 1980, p. 255.
2 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, Third Revised Edition, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p. 717.
3 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, Third Revised Edition, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p. 651.
4 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, Third Revised Edition, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p. 684.
5 The idea that liberty and property are connected "is hardly new". James Madison wrote in 1792: "In a word, as a man is said to
have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights".
6 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom. The Study of How Through the Centuries Private Ownership Has promoted Liberty and the Rule
of Law. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999, pp. 217-218.
7 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom. The Study of How Through the Centuries Private Ownership Has promoted Liberty and the
Rule of Law. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999, p. 214.
8 Vladimir Mau, The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985 – 1994. Foreword by Robert Skidelsky, Centre for
Research Into Communist Economies, New Series 13, London, 1996, p. 20.
9 Vladimir Mau, The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985 – 1994. Foreword by Robert Skidelsky, Centre for
Research Into Communist Economies, New Series 13, London, 1996, p. 19.
10 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, p. 716.
11 Vladimir Mau, The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985 – 1994. Foreword by Robert Skidelsky, Centre for
Research Into Communist Economies, New Series 13, London, 1996, p. 34.
12 Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom. The Study of How Through the Centuries Private Ownership Has promoted Liberty and the
Rule of Law. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999, p. 217.
13 Ludwig von Mises, Hhuman Action, p. 717.
14 Aleksei Uyukaev, Reforming the Russian Economy, 1991 – 1995. Preface by Ljubo Sirc, Centre for Research Into Communist
Economies, New Series 15, London, 1996, p. 40.
15 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, 3rd rev.ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), p.9.
16 J.Rummel, Death by Government, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick – Lnd., 1996, p.1.
17 Murray Rothbard wrote in this respect:" But more troubling is, say, the current situation in Estonia and Latvia, where the
Soviets deliberately tried to swamp and destroy native culture and ethnic nationalism by shipping in a large number of Russians
after World War II to work in the factories. In Latvia, the Russian minority is only slightly under 50 percent. Here, I believe
the recency of this migration and its political nature tip the scales in favor of maintaining native nationalism. In fact,
libertarians believe that everyone has the natural right to self-ownership and ownership of property, but that there is no such
thing as a natural "right" to vote. Here, it would make sense not to allow Russians to vote in Latvia and Estonia, to treat them as
guests or immigrants of indefinite duration, but not with the voting privileges of citizenship." (Murray Rothbard, Irrepressible
Rothbard, p.87).
18 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, Third Revised Edition, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949, p. 651.
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